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All Carrots and No Sticks:
Moving Beyond the Misapplication of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
E. Jacob Lindstrom*
I. TNTRODUCTION
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, the Supreme Court promulgated a new affirmative defense to
employer liability for supervisor harassment of employees.! Ostensibly,
the defense represented a carrot-and-stick compromise: Enhancing
vicarious employer liability with a strict scrutiny standard, while
incentivizing the implementation of anti-harassment measures by allowing
an employer an affirmative defense against claims by employees who
unreasonably failed to utilize effective anti-harassment mechanisms.2 In
theory, the defense makes sense. If employers craft harassment prevention
and correction mechanisms and motivate employees to use such
mechanisms, fewer instances of harassment should occur and more
instances of harassment should be resolved by internal mechanisms rather
than through costly suits.
Lower court application of Ellerth has perverted this compromise and
frustrated Title VII's goals of deterrence and compensation. While lower
court application of the Ellerth defense continues to solidify into law,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, U.C. Hastings College of the Law; B.A. with Distinction
in Political Science, May 2007, Iowa State University. This project began in the summer of
2008 as an assignment from Professor David B. Oppenheimer of Golden Gate University
School of Law. Professor Oppenheimer engaged me as his research assistant to help
examine a proposal by the American Law Institute to extend the Ellerth standard for
vicarious liability to cases outside the field of sexual harassment. He asked me to research
the use of McGinnis and the doctrine of avoidable consequences as an alternative to the
Ellerth standard, focusing on the difference between an affirmative defense protecting the
employer from liability (the Ellerth approach) and a partial offset to damages (the McGinnis
approach). With Professor Oppenheimer's encouragement, I have herein turned to the
question of how Ellerth and McGinnis are being applied. I thank him for his guidance. I
also thank Hillary Jo Baker and the Women's Law Journal Staff for their invaluable
assistance.
1. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). As short hand, this note will often refer to "Ellerth"
or "the Ellerth defense" as the collective ruling.
2. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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academic criticism of the defense rages. Some of these academics have
proposed improvements: Adopting a reasonable woman standard or
imposing heavier discovery burdens on employers.
In California, strict liability for sexual harassment is imposed by
statute. In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court of California
recently decided that the doctrine of mitigation of damages applies to its
anti-harassment statute. The strict liability model combined with the
doctrine of mitigation creates a system that, in theory, is identical to that
created by Ellerth. In practice, however, California's model operates much
differently than the federal model.
This Note will first explore the context and rationale for the employer
liability standard created in Ellerth. Section II will then discuss the
application of Ellerth by lower federal courts, and highlight several patterns
of injustice and inconsistency. Finally, section III will review possible
reforms to the federal system, including an analysis and endorsement of
California's alternative approach.
II. A DECENT SHOT IN THE DARK
The Supreme Court's 1998 Ellerth decision, which created the
affirmative defense, is best understood as a compromise between
competing frameworks of vicarious employer liability. Should employers
be held strictly liable for sexual harassment or merely liable where they are
negligent in preventing or correcting the harassment? The Supreme Court
wrestled with this question for over a decade before deciding Ellerth, and
the Court's struggles are instructive for understanding the standard it
ultimately crafted.
After Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it
became unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 3 By 1980, Title VII regulatory guidelines and judicial
decisions established that actionable discrimination extended beyond quid
pro quo harassment, wherein employment itself is made directly contingent
upon submission to sexual harassment.4 These guidelines and decisions
made clear that actionable discrimination also included so-called "hostile
work environment" harassment, wherein a hostile or offensive work
environment unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.
What remained unclear, however, was the extent to which employers
could be held vicariously liable for the harassment of employees by
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2009).
4. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
5. 29 CFR § 1604.1 1(a) (1985).
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supervisors. In 1986, this question reached the Supreme Court in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.6 The decision did not definitively resolve the
employer liability question, but it laid an important foundation upon which
the Court relied heavily thirteen years later in Ellerth.
Upon being terminated after four years of work, Mechelle Vinson
brought suit under Title VII against her former employer Meritor Savings
Bank.7 Vinson alleged she was subjected to constant sexual harassment
from her supervisor, Sidney Taylor. 8 Vinson testified that shortly after
hiring her, Taylor propositioned her for sex, to which she acquiesced out of
fear for her job.9  Thereafter, Taylor "fondled her in front of other
employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several
occasions."'
After an eleven-day trial, the district court determined that Vinson had
not been the victim of quid pro quo sexual harassment while employed at
the bank, but nevertheless proceeded to analyze the bank's vicarious
liability." Because the bank had an express policy against discrimination
and Vinson had failed to file a complaint, the court determined that the
bank could not be held liable because it was without notice of the
conduct. 12
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the district court
failed to consider whether Vinson had made out a sexual harassment claim
based on hostile work environment.' 3 Importantly, the D.C. Circuit also
held that employers are absolutely liable for supervisor harassment of
employees under Title VII. 14 This argument chiefly relied on Title VII's
definition of "employer" as "agent," a word which the court determined
indicated Congress's intent to apply the common law of agency liability to
Title VII. 15 Under the common law, a principal is vicariously liable for a
tort committed by: (a) an agent acting under the principal's actual
authority, and (b) an agent purportedly acting on behalf of the principal
when apparent authority enables the tort to be committed or concealed.
16
As such, the D.C. Circuit held that employer liability will always attach to
supervisor harassment because "the mere existence - or even the
6. 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986).
7. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
8. Id.
9. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 61-62.
12. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1986).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 63.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63.
16. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1957). See also Restatement (Third) of
Agency, §§ 7.04, 7.08 (2006).
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appearance - of a significant degree of influence in vital job decisions
gives any supervisor the opportunity to impose on employees." 7
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's holding that Title VII
prohibits both economic quidpro quo and noneconomic "hostile or abusive
work environment" claims.' 8 The Court went on, however, to reject both
the trial and appellate court formulations of employer liability. With only a
cryptic "see generally" citation to sections 219 through 237 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, those sections detailing actual and
apparent authority, the Court found that "the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors."' 9 The Court also found that "absence of
notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from
liability."2 ° Finally, the Court responded to the bank's argument that its
anti-discrimination policy should save it from liability. "The mere
existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination,
coupled with respondent's failure to invoke that procedure" failed to
insulate the bank from liability because the policy did not specifically
address sexual harassment and because the grievance procedure required
Vinson to first complain to her direct supervisor, the alleged harasser.2'
The Court's conclusion foreshadowed what was to come: "Petitioner's
contention that respondent's failure [to report] should insulate it from
liability might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better
calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward.,
22
In the post-Meritor world, two themes emerged. First, courts
rigorously distinguished sexual harassment claims between quid pro quo
23
and hostile work environment. Employers were subject to "automatic"
vicarious liability for quid pro quo claims. For hostile work environment
17. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63. Note that this viewpoint would compel the adoption of
strict employer liability, something California has adopted by statute.
18. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67.
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 73-74. Future courts seem to have turned these identified deficiencies -
the promulgation of a policy specifically condemning sexual harassment and a procedural
bypass for reporting around supervisors - into a standard for determining the
reasonableness of employer policies. While Faragher restated these twin-requirements as
baseline deficiencies, lower courts have held that satisfaction of these twin-requirements is
sufficient to make a prima facie showing of the first prong, shifting the burden to the
plaintiff and making summary judgment appropriate. Compare Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808-09 (1998), with Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir.
1999).
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
23. Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 204 (2004). Note that Ellerth
subsequently critiqued this dichotomy, holding that to state a Title VII claim of sexual
harassment one must either show "tangible employment action resulted" or conduct which
was "severe or pervasive." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-54.
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claims, courts applied the "actual-or-constructive knowledge standard"
(i.e., negligence) regardless of whether the harasser was a supervisor or a
coworker.24 Second, anti-harassment policies obtained paramount status in
employer defenses. One study found that after Meritor, the existence of a
policy specifically addressing sexual harassment and containing a bypass
procedure for reporting around direct supervisors substantially increased
the employer's ability to avoid liability.
25
Read against this backdrop, Ellerth can be seen as accepting the agency
theory argued by the D.C. Circuit in Meritor - that common law agency
rules entail that supervisor harassment is advanced by virtue of the
supervisor's apparent authority, therefore, employers should be held strictly
liable. However, the Ellerth Court was unwilling to entirely release the
floodgates of litigation currently being blocked by the Meritor negligence
standard.26
Wrestling with this dilemma, the Court considered adopting a rule that
liability would attach only where the harassing supervisor made "active or
affirmative" use of his authority.27 The Court rejected this rule for the
reasons put forth by the D.C. Circuit court in Meritor: "Supervisors do not
make speeches threatening sanctions whenever they make requests in the
legitimate exercise of managerial authority, and yet every subordinate
employee knows the sanctions exist. 28
Ultimately, the Court reached the creative compromise that strict
liability should apply, but to mitigate against the "automatic liability"
effects of strict liability, employers would have a new affirmative
defense. 29 The "active or affirmative" test was not entirely abandoned,
however, because the Court limited its application of the defense to hostile
work environment claims. 30 As such, employers are strictly liable for quid
pro quo harassment, i.e., "active" harassment which affects tangible
employment status. Examples of such tangible employment actions
include "hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
24. Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency
Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229,
1237 (1991).
25. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Scwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 591 (2001) ("Our study shows that when an employer has a program
that allows victims to report sexual harassment, plaintiffs are successful barely one-third of
the time, far less than in other cases.").
26. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 ("[T]here are good reasons for vicarious liability for
misuse of supervisory authority[, but w]e are not entitled to recognize this theory under Title
VII unless we can square it with Meritor's holding that an employer is not 'automatically'
liable for harassment by a supervisor.").
27. Id. at 804-06.
28. Id. at 805.
29. Id.
30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61.
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benefits.",3' In contrast, harassment that has not culminated in a tangible
employment action must be "severe or pervasive" to constitute a Title VII
violation.32 For these latter hostile work environment claims, employers
are strictly liable, but the "defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages. 33
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.34
The highly analytical nature of these cases should not overshadow the
underlying lives involved. Kimberly Ellerth brought suit against her
employer for sexual harassment by her supervisor Ted Slowik.35 Ellerth
claimed that Slowik made "repeated boorish and offensive remarks and
gestures" to Ellerth, many of which implied that if Ellerth was "looser" or
wore "shorter skirts," "her job would be easier., 36 The district court in
Ellerth found Slowik's behavior "severe and pervasive enough to create a
hostile work environment," but granted summary judgment for Ellerth's
employer because Ellerth never reported the incidents and the employer
therefore "neither knew nor should have known about the conduct., 37 A
divided en banc Seventh Circuiteventually reversed in a decision with eight
conflicting opinions.
38
Beth Ann Faragher sued her employer for sexual harassment by two of
her supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman. 39 The trial court found
that Terry and Silverman "repeatedly subject[ed] Faragher and other female
lifeguards to 'uninvited and offensive touching,' ma[de] lewd remarks, and
sp[oke] of women in offensive terms., 40 The trial court found Faragher's
employer vicariously liable, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding,
inter alia, that the employer had no actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment because Faragher never reported the conduct.4'
After crafting this new defense, the Court remanded Ellerth's claim so
her employer could offer evidence to prove the affirmative defense.42 As to
Faragher's employer, the Court was not so accommodating. Because
31. Id. at 761.
32. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-54.
33. Id. at 765.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 747-48.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 749.
38. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 90 (7th Cir. 1997).
39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
40. Id. at 780-83.
41. Id. at 783-84.
42. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766.
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Faragher's employer had "entirely failed to disseminate its policy against
sexual harassment" and the employer's complaint procedure did not have a
bypass around harassing supervisors, the Court held "as a matter of law that
the [employer] could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to
prevent the supervisor's harassing conduct.,
43
In addition to justifying its holding as a logical product of common law
agency liability principles and existing precedent, especially Meritor, the
Court asserted that its rule created an incentive system consistent with Title
VII's goal of deterrence and the traditional duty of mitigation.4 According
to the Court, Title VII's "primary purpose" was "not to provide redress but
to avoid harm." 4 Moreover, the doctrine of mitigation has an established
place in our common law of damages.46 Encouraging employers to "take
all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring"
incentivized employers to be consistent with Title VII's goal of
47deterrence. Encouraging employees to utilize these preventive measures
incentivized employees to be consistent with the common law principle of
mitigation.48 "If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the
employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover
damages that could have been avoided if she had done So."
4 9
Academics have heavily criticized this incentive rule. Professor Anne
Lawton writes, "By hinging liability on a response to harassment that is
uncommon, especially in cases involving supervisors, the Court created a
legal rule that from its inception was unlikely to promote the state goal of
prevention., 50  Professor Theresa M. Beiner similarly argues that the
defense's second prong, employee unreasonableness, "does not reflect the
manner in which many women respond to harassment," and, as a result,
supervisor harassment has flourished. 5' Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp has
also criticized the defense's first prong, employer reasonableness, arguing
that there is very little empirical evidence that employee educational
programming can diminish harassment. Moreover, she argues there is
evidence that many programs can have adverse affects which may actually
promote harassment.52
43. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808-09.
44. Id.
45. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
46. Id.
47. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
48. Id.
49. Id. 806-07.
50. Lawton, supra note 24, at 198.
51. Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 117, 117 (2001).
52. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2001).
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Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger offers a modest defense of Ellerth
by arguing that although the affirmative defense may not be empirically
justifiable, the decision is justifiable in a normative sense: Employers
should have polices against harassment, they should take steps to prevent
and correct harassment, and employees should report harassment. 53 While
this may be an appealing argument for saving Ellerth on a purely
theoretical plane, it is a weak defense in reality. Although the Court
employed normative language and spoke mostly in the theoretical realm of
agency law, the Court assuages its own concerns by claiming that its rule
will be an effective deterrent against sexual harassment. In making this
claim, the Court makes an empirically premised assertion. According to
the Court, the rule will be so effective in reality, that many plaintiffs will
not have to bring claims because harassing conduct will be remedied before
culminating in actionable harassment.
We need not escape into the theoretical heavens in order to defend
Ellerth. If the goal were simply to eliminate sexual harassment, courts
would impose strict liability on employers for all supervisor harassment.
But there is also an interest in fairness to employers, which balances
against imposing liability without fault. With competing values,
compromise is sensible: Impose strict liability for actions made possible
only by the principal's delegation of power (e.g., hiring, firing, etc.). But,
imposing vicarious liability for hostile work environment claims would
seem too sweeping on employers because they are limited in what they can
do to prevent such conduct absolutely. In theory, an employer could
safeguard itself from liability by not hiring supervisors, but employers need
to delegate power and work in order to survive economically. So Ellerth
crafted a balance: The courts will impose vicarious liability by default, but
if an employers has worked hard at preventing and correcting harassment
and if the employee has chosen not to utilize corrective mechanisms, then
the courts will absolve the employer of the preventable damages. If applied
with the aim of deterrence and mitigation in mind, the rule should
encourage employers to adopt effective preventive and corrective
mechanisms that should prevent much harassment. An effective policy,
combined with an accessible reporting system, should prevent hostile work
environment claims from becoming actionable. Both parties benefit, and
fewer resources are consumed by litigation.
Note, however, that employers will only adopt effective preventive and
corrective polices if courts require them to do so. If courts do not inquire
into the effectiveness of employer procedures, the procedures will not
necessarily deter harassment. Without judicial inquiry, employers will
53. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment -
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and
Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 195 (2001).
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have no incentive to craft effective policies and employers will be able to
secure the benefits of the affirmative defense; however, harassment will not
be deterred - not to mention the added tragedy that victims will receive no
compensation. Without judicial inquiry into reasonableness of the
employer under the first prong and of the employee under the second
prong, the Ellerth compromise collapses.
III. ELLERTH APPLIED: HOW IT GOT SO UGLY
Ellerth's utopian view of eradicating sexual harassment has not been
realized. Because it failed to clearly articulate a standard, the Supreme
Court is at least partially to blame for the failure of lower courts to apply
any sort of standard for employers to show the effectiveness of their
preventive and corrective measures.54 The Supreme Court cannot be held
entirely responsible; however, because lower courts are not actually
applying Ellerth. Lower courts immediately perverted the rule and applied
it in a variety of ways to the exclusive and undeserved benefit of
employers.
A. A COMPLETE DEFENSE TO LIABILITY
The most striking feature in lower court application of the defense has
been the virtual unanimity with which the defense is applied to absolve the
employer of all liability.55 Notwithstanding Ellerth's characterization of
itself as an "affirmative defense to liability or damages,"56 lower courts
have unanimously applied the defense as a tool for complete liability
avoidance.
Ellerth cites the "doctrine of avoidable consequences" as a justification
for the affirmative defense it created.57 Ellerth relied on Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, in which the Court held that an employer who violated Title VII
was liable to an employee for damages only from the point at which the
employee was terminated until the point at which the employer offered to
rehire the employee.58 An employer is liable to an employee for the
damages caused from the time at which Title VII is violated until some
point in the future where the employee could reasonably prevent further
damages without "undue risk or expense., 59 "If the victim could have
avoided harm [entirely], no liability should be found against the employer
54. On this point, Professor Bisom-Rapp has argued that one reform to actualize this
enforcement is to require employers to produce empirical data supporting their programs.
See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52. Further discussion on this point is advanced in subsequent
sections.
55. The author was not able to find a single case in which lower court application the
Ellerth defense resulted merely in the reduction of damages.
56. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
57. Id. at 764.
58. 458 U.S. 219, 232-35 (1982).
59. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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who had taken reasonable care and if damages could reasonably have been
mitigated no award against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for
what her own efforts could have avoided. 60
Although lower courts recognize that the Ellerth defense is grounded in
the "doctrine of avoidable consequences, ' 61 these courts have contorted the
employee's duty of mitigation such that damages are essentially
unobtainable if the employer had in place a policy specifically prohibiting
harassment and a complaint procedure with a harassing-supervisor-
bypass.62 Where these policies exist, some circuit courts have declared as a
matter of law that employees should always be able to complain about
harassment before a hostile work environment is created. 63  The Fifth
Circuit held that "[i]f the plaintiff complains promptly, the then-incidental
misbehavior can be stymied before it erupts into a hostile environment, and
no actionable Title VII violation will have occurred. 6 4  This reasoning
presumes that hostile work environment claims are not created by single
incidents, and that if an employee simply complains after the first incident,
since a single incident should not yet constitute a Title VII violation, the
employee will always be able to prevent hostile work environments.65 "It
is, of course, theoretically possible for a supervisor to engage in sufficiently
severe conduct (e.g., raping, 'flashing,' or forcibly groping or disrobing the
subordinate employee) in such a short period of time that, even though (1)
the employee reports the conduct immediately, (2) the employer takes swift
and decisive remedial action, and (3) no tangible employment action
ensues, the employer could still be held vicariously liable under the Ellerth
'severe or pervasive' test.",66 No cases, however, reflect this "theoretica[l]
possib[ility]."
The courts' presumption offers a window into the courts' views on how
reasonable employees respond to harassment. This viewpoint fails to
recognize the substantial psychological, political, and social costs that
prevent employees from reporting every incident of harassing conduct.
67
The courts' unrealistic vision of the reasonable employee's response to
60. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
61. Akers v. Alvey, 180 F. Supp. 2d 894, 902 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (rev'd on other
grounds, 338 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2003).
62. This requirement flows from Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73-74.
63. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1999).
64. Id.
65. The injustice created by lower courts is therefore not entirely attributable to their
misapplication of Ellerth. At least some of the injustice results from a perversity in the
"severe or pervasive" case law. But lower court misapplication of Ellerth clearly
exacerbates this perversity.
66. Indest, v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 804 n.52 (5th Cir. 1999)
(Wiener, J., specially concurring).
67. This argument is expanded in proceeding sections.
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harassment has become a central theme in the tragedy of Ellerth's
application.
B. FORCING EMPLOYEES TO DISPROVE THE DEFENSE
Ellerth provided that "a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.68 The first prong of this defense is proving that "the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior. ''69  Ellerth gives little guidance on what should
constitute "reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly."
Lower courts have generally found satisfaction of this first prong where
the employer merely demonstrates the existence of an anti-harassment
policy.70 Once employers have satisfied this de minimis task, the burden
shifts to the employee to prove that the employer's policy is ineffective or
that the employer otherwise acted unreasonably. Courts essentially never
inquire into the social science supporting anti-harassment programs, despite
the availability of such data to employers who were genuinely concerned,




Instead of inquiring into the effectiveness of employer procedures, the
first prong of Ellerth has become a toothless exercise in paperwork for
employers and a sword against employees. Courts generally defer to
employer definitions of what constitutes an appropriate employee response
to harassment, rather than make a judicial determination of how a
reasonable employee would respond. In Ritchie v. Stamler, the Sixth
Circuit rejected a plaintiffs argument that her employer's policy was
ineffective because it required her to complain in writing to the president of
a large company.72 In Jackson v. Arkansas Department of Education, the
Eighth Circuit found that a victim of harassment unreasonably failed to use
her employer's remediation mechanism because, although she promptly
reported her supervisor's harassing conduct, she refused to confront her
harassing supervisor in a remediation conference.73 In Coates v. Sundor
Brands, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the question of whether
the employer had been given notice of plaintiffs harassment was "made
68. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999); Lissau v. Southern
Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that "evidence that
[employer] had disseminated an effective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof
of its efforts to prevent workplace harassment").
71. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52. Subsequent sections expand on this point.
72. 2000 WL 84461, *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2000).
73. 272 F.3d 1020, 1023, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 2001).
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easy" because the employer had defined "notice" in its anti-harassment
policy.
74
The same theme - refusing to apply the defense as an empirically
grounded incentivizing device - has played out in the second prong.
Ellerth required employers to show that "the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 75 As
already noted, courts tend to simply presume unreasonable employee
conduct when a hostile work environment results.76 Courts often frame this
presumption in terms of the employee's unreasonable delay in reporting,
such that when an employee describes the history of harassment, courts
emphasize the temporal gap between the first incident and the date of
report.77 This framing is disingenuous because no amount of delay would
be accepted under the courts' logic. Examples abound of plaintiffs who
were summarily denied as a result of these "unreasonable delays."
In Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., in the Eastern District of Missouri, the
court dismissed a sexual harassment claim by Rita Phillips against her
supervisor Duane Sonntag.78 The court found that Phillips was subjected to
unwanted sexual contact on March 13, June 12, June 14, June 17, and June
18.79 Phillips formally complained on June 20 of the same year.80 The
court found Phillips' "delay of three months and seven days between the
first incident of harassment and a plaintiffs first complaint" to be
unreasonable as a matter of law.
81
In Conatzer v. Medical Professional Building Services, Inc., in the
Northern District of Oklahoma, the court rejected a sexual harassment
claim by Crystal Conatzer against her supervisor Dale Woodruff.
82
Throughout 2001, Woodruff made numerous sexually inappropriate
comments to and initiated frequent unwanted physical contact with
Conatzer.83 On September 28, according to a witness, "[Conatzer] bent
over to pick something up or to access a lower drawer for something and
74. 164 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11 th Cir. 1999).
75. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
76. Coates, 164 F.3d at 1367.
77. Of course, the irony here is that no amount of delay would be sufficient for many
courts. "Faragher implies that a plaintiff should not wait as long as it usually takes for a
sexually hostile working environment to develop when the company has an effective
grievance mechanism. If the plaintiff complains promptly, the then-incidental misbehavior
can be stymied before it erupts into a hostile environment, and no actionable Title VII
violation will have occurred." Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 267
(1999).
78. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
79. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
80. Id. at 1033-34.
81. Id. at 1034.
82. 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1271 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
83. Id. at 1263-64.
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while she was bent over, [Woodruff] placed his hand on her head or neck
and directed her head towards his lap and held her there for a second or
two."84 On October 15 of the same year, Conatzer formally complained.
85
The court found Conatzer's delay of seventeen days in reporting this
incident, especially in light of the preceding conduct, to be unreasonable.
86
It seems that courts are more understanding of employer delays in
responding to complaints than of employees' delay in reporting. In
Anderson v. Leigh, the court dismissed an employer's eight-day lapse in
responding to Toni Anderson's harassment complaint as a "short delay,"
while finding that Anderson had unreasonably delayed in reporting the
harassment.8 7 Anderson had been subjected to harassment on August 23,
24, 26, 29, 31, September 1, 6, and 7, and formally complained on
September 7 of the same year.
88
Despite plentiful scholarship showing the reasonableness of a victim's
delay in reporting harassment, courts have refused to develop any
framework for considering the reasonableness of delayed reporting. Courts
have even refused to adopt the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's standards, which recognize that an employee's failure to use
an employer's complaint procedure may not be unreasonable if: (a) the
employee "reasonably feared retaliation," (b) the procedure involved
obstacles like "undue expense," "inaccessible points of contact," or
"intimidating or burdensome requirements," or (c) "failure was based on a
reasonable belief that the process was ineffective." 89
The failure of courts to develop a framework for considering the
reasonableness of delayed reporting has resulted in outrageous outcomes.
In Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for the employer on Luanne Walton's sexual
harassment claim.90 Walton claimed to have been raped three times in a
two-month period by her supervisor, who brandished his gun while
propositioning her.9' Out of emotional trauma and fear of retaliation, she
delayed reporting for two months.92 The court concluded that Ellerth
"requires the employee in normal circumstances to make this painful effort
if the employee wants to impose vicarious liability on the employer and
84. Id. at 1264.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1270.
87. 2000 WL 193075, *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000).
88. Id. at * 1-2.
89. The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Notice No
915.002, Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment
by Supervisors, 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) No. 289, at 615:0101 (June 18, 1999),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
90. 347 F.3d 1272 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 959 (2004).
91. Id. at 1274-77.
92. Id. at 1277, 1289.
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collect damages under Title VII., 9 3  The court's emphasis reflects an
attempted moral rationalization: A rape victim need only undergo the
burden of immediately initiating an employer's complaint mechanism if
she wants to "collect" a money judgment. The problem with this
rationalization is that it leaves victims, whose response to harassment is
entirely reasonable and predicable, without "compensat[ion] for their
injuries" 94 - not to mention that it also leaves harassers undeterred.
To make the situation worse, despite Ellerth's self-characterization as a
defense to liability or damages, courts employ Ellerth as a complete
defense to liability. In other areas of tort law, courts undertake complex
analyses of multiple causal factors, and reduce damages pro rata. For
example, courts could adopt a kind of comparative negligence standard in
evaluating the employee's failure to report. Where an effective grievance
mechanism exists, it is a reasonable conclusion that some causal
responsibility rests on the non-reporting employee. But it cannot be said
straight-faced that her failure to report caused all of the damage. "[T]he
mere existence - or even the appearance - of a significant degree of
influence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to
impose on employees. 95  Nevertheless, courts continue to completely
absolve employers of liability, relying on the premise that reasonable
employees can prevent hostile work environments before they culminate in
Title VII violations.
The implication of this model-reporting-employee viewpoint is the
devaluation of the second prong of Ellerth, and some courts have actually
gone so far as to explicitly eliminate the second prong. In Indest, the Fifth
Circuit found that Ellerth did "not control" in a case where an employer
quickly responded to a harassment claim.96  Although stating that the
Ellerth defense contains "two necessary elements," 97 the Fifth Circuit
refused to follow Ellerth and concluded that "[i]mposing vicarious liability
on an employer for a supervisor's 'hostile environment' actions despite its
swift and appropriate remedial response to the victim's complaint would
thus undermine not only Meritor but Title VII's deterrent policy."98 The
Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Watkins v. Professional Sec.
Bureau, Ltd.:
93. Id. at 1290 (emphasis in original) (quoting Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333
F.3d 27, 35 (lst Cir. 2003). Interestingly, Reed overturned a district court decision with
similar facts to Walton. In Reed, a thirty-four-year-old supervisor forced a seventeen-year-
old employee to perform oral sex and explicitly threatened retaliation if she reported the
incident. 333 F.3d at 30-31.
94. Ford Motor, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982).
95. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63.
96. Indest, 164 F.3d at 265.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 266.
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Although the Supreme Court did not speak to this issue in
Burlington Industries, we cannot conceive that an employer that
satisfies the first element of the affirmative defense and that
promptly and adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual
harassment... would be held liable for the harassment on the basis
of an inability to satisfy the literal terms of the second element of
the affirmative defense. Such a result would be wholly contrary to
a laudable purpose behind limitations on employer liability
identified by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries: to
promote conciliation. 99
Similarly, the Second Circuit redefined the second prong to include
either "(a) the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise, or (b) the employee complained and the employer
took prompt and appropriate corrective action in response to [the]
complaint."'00  It is not surprising, therefore, that a survey of sexual
harassment cases found that courts almost always awarded summary
judgment for the employer where an employer satisfied the first prong of
Ellerth. lO'
These cases fail to appreciate Ellerth's compromise between two
competing goals: fairness to employers and deterrence. Abolition of the
second prong perverts this compromise. It returns the standard of employer
liability to the pre-Ellerth fault-based system without also taking away the
defense which Ellerth crafted solely to mitigate against the harshness of a
strict liability standard.
C. THE OBJECTIFICATION OF ELLERTH
Whether by design or effect, lower courts have removed the
traditionally fact-intensive analysis of "reasonableness" and objectified the
Ellerth defense, thus making it highly susceptible to summary judgment.
Notwithstanding that Ellerth requires an employer to prove it acted
reasonably in preventing and correcting supervisor harassment and that the
employee acted unreasonably, lower courts have transformed these
factually intensive reasonableness inquiries into bright-line objective tests.
This has allowed employers to prevail easily via summary judgment by
meeting these simple objective tests, and to avoid a fact-intensive jury
defense. As already discussed, employers need only show the existence of
99. 1999 WL 1032614, *5 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999). Referenced in Table of
Decisions without Reported Opinions by 201 F.3d 439 (Table) (4th Cir. 1999).
100. Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Group, Inc., 8 Fed.Appx. 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
101. David Sherwyn, et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your 1-800
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1265 (2001).
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an anti-harassment policy in order to satisfy the first prong. Likewise,
employers generally need only show that the employee failed to give them
notice of the harassment, and "notice" is definable by the employers' own
policies. Employers need only show these minimal objective facts to win
on summary judgment.
As already discussed, Ellerth's empirically premised claims - that
effective employer procedures will deter harassment if employees
reasonably utilize them - can only be realized if Ellerth is applied with an
empirical focus. As to the first prong, Professor Lawton has argued that
under this objectified system, employers are incentivized to produce
polices which no empirical evidence shows to be at all effective (e.g.,
creating and disseminating policy statements and administrative
procedures).10 2 That is, because courts have held that the mere existence of
an anti-discrimination policy satisfies the first prong, employers are
incentivized to do no more effort than create an anti-discrimination policy,
regardless of what empirical studies indicate about such policies. Professor
Bisom-Rapp has shown that many common anti-harassment policies and
training might actually promote harassment by polarizing employees'
opinions about complainants, encouraging potential aggressors by
informing them that most harassment goes unreported, and by luring
management into a false sense security.'
0 3
The importance of a more searching factual inquiry is also important
for the second prong, especially where advances in social and medical
science indicate that reporting is an exceedingly rare response for victims
of sexual harassment. Medical studies now conclude that more than half of
rape victims experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). 10
4
Thus, more likely than not, victims of sexual harassment who have also
been raped will experience PTSD, an inference which a jury would likely
find reasonably justifies delayed reporting. Moreover, other studies
102. Lawton, supra note 23, at 215 (discussing studies which reveal the
ineffectiveness of most employer polices and arguing that employers should focus more to
improve organizational culture and understand the predictive value ofjob gender context).
103. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 52, at 30-44. See also See Hillary Jo Baker, No Good
Deed Goes Unpunished: Protecting Gender Discrimination Named Plaintiffs from
Employer Attacks, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 118-19 (2009) ("In Mitsubishi, after
charges were filed, the plant provided a sexual harassment training session. One of the class
members was at the training and observed a male coworker stand up and proclaim to the
auditorium, 'I'll tell you one f-ing thing. Whoever turns me in and tries to cause me to lose
my job is going to lose theirs too.' No one, including the trainers or manager present, said a
thing. In another incident at the plant, someone wrote, 'If any cunt causes me to lose my
job, I am going on a cunt hunt,' in the women's bathroom.").
104. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science
and Admissibility of Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 17
(2001).
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suggest reporting harassment is an extraordinarily rare victim response.
10 5
A 1994 study of federal employees found that while forty-four percent of
female and nineteen percent of male federal employees reported being
harassed, only twelve percent of those harassed reported the conduct.'
0 6
Another study found that only ten percent of employees reported. 0 7 Even
more troubling than these already dismal reporting rates, Professor Tanya
Kateri Hernandez found that women of color were ten times less likely to
report harassment. 10 8 This low reporting is on top of increased rates of
harassment against women of color. 09 All of these numbers suggest either
that most harassment victims act unreasonably or that lower courts' should
reconsider their reasonableness inquiry.
D. PUSHING EMPLOYEES OUT OF DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
Requiring employees to report harassment before it has culminated in a
violation of Title VII pushes harassment cases out of courts, where victims
are entitled to civil rights protections, and into a system in which corporate
efficiency is valued above due process. 0 Internal dispute managers tend
to recast legal issues as interpersonal and management issues."' Victims
who handle complaints in internal dispute systems tend to be without
attorney representation and therefore are not fully informed about their
legal rights and remedies." 2 Moreover, internal dispute systems tend to
deny victims the evidentiary protections afforded by legal rules of evidence
(e.g., exclusion of hearsay and evidence of past sexual conduct).1 3 Most
troubling, employees who complain of only a few single incidents of
relatively minor harassment might not be entitled to the protections
105. See, e.g., Sandy Welsh & James E. Gruber, Not Taking it Any More: Women
who Report or File Complaints of Sexual Harassment, 36.4 CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. &
ANTHROPOLOGY 559, 559-60 (1999) (finding that few victims of sexual harassment confront
the harasser or report the harassment to their superiors, and that even fewer victims file
formal complaints).
106. UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGERS 14, 30 (1994).
107. Sharyn A. Lenhar & Diane K. Shrier, Potential Costs and Benefits of Sexual
Harassment Litigation, 26 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 132, 132-33 (1996).
108. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical Research
Project: Sexual Harassment & The Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1235, 1255-56 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Lauren B. Edelman, et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of
Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497, 511 (1993); see also Lauren B.
Edelman, et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1999).
111. Edelmen, supra note 110, at 516.
112. Edelmen, supra note 110, at 519-20.
113. Edelmen, supra note 110, at 520; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (limiting
admissibility of victim's past sexual behavior).
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afforded by retaliation laws if there is no reasonable belief of a Title VII
violation.1 14
The transformation of Ellerth from a principle of mitigation to a tool
for complete liability avoidance, the burden-shifting to employees, and the
complete elimination of the second prong all have had the effect of
removing the stick from Ellerth, so all that now remains is the carrot of
liability avoidance. Even this remaining incentive is ineffective as a
deterrent to harassment because it is freely given to any employer who
merely shows the existence of an anti-harassment policy and a grievance
mechanism. An "incentive" system which merely rewards employers for
ineffective and possibly harassment-inducing policies is no incentive
system at all. Meritor recognized that employers should not be shielded
from liability unless "[grievance] procedures [are] calculated to encourage
victims of harassment to come forward."" 5 Reform of this system is sorely
needed.
III. BEYOND ELLERTH
Ellerth was intended to create an incentive structure whereby
harassment would be diminished. This emphasis on deterrence was at the
cost of some compensation to employees, but the Court believed Title VII's
primary purpose was "not to provide redress but to avoid harm."'"16 As the
Court noted in 1982, "when unlawful discrimination does occur, Title VII's
secondary, fallback purpose is to compensate the victims for their
injuries., "7" As such, it is particularly tragic that while lower courts have
refused to apply Ellerth in an incentivizing method, they simultaneously
deny compensation to victims of harassment. The current application of
Ellerth neither deters harassment nor compensates victims.
More troubling still is Ellerth's expansion into other areas of
employment law. It would be particularly tragic if the American Law
Institute adopted Ellerth as an affirmative defense generally applicable to
all types of employer liability." 1
8
In light of these problems and Ellerth's expansion, it is increasingly
important to find a way to address employer liability beyond the Ellerth
doctrine that dominates our federal courts. Professor Alex Long has
114. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 129 S.Ct.
846, 851 (2009).
115. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 74 (1986) (emphasis
added).
116. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998).
117. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982).
118. At the time of printing, the ALl is considering various drafts of the Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law. To adopt Ellerth as a general principle would be particularly
disingenuous given that California and other jurisdictions have refused to follow Ellerth.
California's approach is discussed below.
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persuasively argued for the development of a New Judicial Federalism,
where state courts refuse to follow federal precedent in lock-step
uniformity without independent reasoning.19 Following the advice of
William J. Brennan Jr., 120 Long advocates a framework of judicial
federalism whereby states apply the rules that make the most sense to them,
even where federal courts have already interpreted identical text in federal
law to apply a different rule.1 21 In this vein, employment law scholars and
American Law Institute committee members would do well to consider the
alternative approaches to employer liability for supervisor harassment.
1 22
A. THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
In response to courts' unrealistic expectations about how reasonable
women respond to harassment, some academics have suggested adoption of
a more tailored reasonableness standard. Professor Camille Hebert has
argued in favor of judicial adoption of the "reasonable woman" standard or
the "reasonable victim" standard as a reform for this "failure to promptly
report" cases. 123 Professor Hebert catalogues survey data showing the low
rate at which women actually report harassment and found that women
provide similar explanations for this response: fear of retaliation, concerns
about confidentiality, concern that no action will be taken, harm to the
harasser, harm to themselves, fear of not being believed, and fear of being
blamed for conduct. 24  Poignantly, Professor Hebert found that women
previously subjected sexual harassment were especially unlikely to report
the conduct.12 5 Professor Hebert concludes that courts should consider this
empirical information about real women in considering the reasonableness
of a woman's failure to report.12 6 After making similar findings of victims'
119. See Alex B. Long, If the Train Should Jump the Track . . . : Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV.
469, 475 (2006). See also Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285
(1987) (holding that federal anti-discrimination law is a "floor" and "not a ceiling" for state
law).
120. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) ("[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do
well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts... .
121. See Long, supra note 119.
122. Of course, one alternative not discussed in this Note is to eliminate defense
entirely, leaving only strict liability. This would increase the cost of harassment,
incentivizing employer investment in preventive mechanisms. Moreover, businesses can
bear the costs of harassment on their balance sheets more easily than can individual victims.
This position also flows from the D.C. Circuit's conclusion in Meritor that "the mere
existence - or even the appearance - of a significant degree of influence in vital job
decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to impose on employees." 477 U.S. at 63.
123. L. Camille Hebert, Why Don't 'Reasonable Women' Complain About Sexual
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711 (2007).
124. Id. at 737-38.
125. Id. at 740.
126. Hebert, supra 123, at 742-43.
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propensity to report and the reasonable justifications for such responses,
Professor Beiner similarly concludes that courts should "listen to the stories
of these women and understand the predicament in which sexual
harassment places them."'
2 7
This recommendation is not, however, fully supported. In her modest
defense of Ellerth, Professor Krieger argues that it does not follow from the
fact the women do not report harassment that women should not be
incentivized to report harassment. 28 "Normative and descriptive accounts
of human behavior made relevant by legal rules do not and need not always
correspond to render those rules sound as a matter of social policy or just as
a matter of moral philosophy."' 129 Krieger notes that courts likewise do not
"listen to the stories" of or adopt tailored reasonableness standards for
sloppy surgeons or drunk drivers. 130
B. GREATER PRODUCTION BURDENS
Professor Lawton concludes her critique of Ellerth and the lower court
application of it with a call for greater production demands on
employers. 3 ' She argues that employers should be required to produce
past complaint records because "if an employer rarely sanctions harassers,
even for egregious misconduct, employees may be reticent to invoke the
employer's grievance machinery."'' 32 Lawton argues employers should also
be required to produce evidence that the company has monitored past
complainants so as to insulate them from retaliation, evidence of
employees' evaluations of preventive and corrective mechanisms, and
management evaluations screening for compliance with polices. 33
Even if greater production burdens were not an additional pleading
requirement, more effective incentivizing would result if courts borrowed
the best-practices model from malpractice tort law.
C. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH: MCGINNIS
While the U.S. Supreme Court has had to infer prohibition against
sexual harassment from Title VII, 3 4 California's Fair Employment &
Housing Act (FEHA) expressly prohibits sexual harassment. 35  Section
129400)(1) attaches liability to employers for sexual harassment
committed by a co-employee or third party only if the employer "(a) knew
or should have known of the harassing conduct and (b) failed to take
127. Beiner, supra note 51, at 142.
128. Krieger, supra note 53, at 195.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Lawton, supra note 23, at 266-69.
132. Id. at 267.
133. Lawton, supra note 23, at 267.
134. Meritor, 477 U.S.at 65.
135. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (West 2009).
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immediate and appropriate corrective action." 13 6  By contrast, section
12940 simply makes sexual harassment of employees by employers and
supervisors unlawful, and California courts have interpreted the statute as
imposing strict liability for such conduct, regardless of distinctions between
quidpro quo and hostile work environment claims.
137
Despite these differences, California courts' interpretation of FEHA
has often tracked federal interpretation of Title VII, 138 and after the U.S.
Supreme Court announced Ellerth, California employers began to argue for
the adoption of the defense in California. In 2003, one of these cases, State
Department of Health Services v. Superior Court (McGinnis), reached the
California Supreme Court.'
139
Theresa McGinnis worked for the California Department of Health
Services and in 1995 Cary Hall became her supervisor. 140  McGinnis
alleged Hall began harassing her in early 1996 and continued until late
1997.141 She described an incident in July 1995 in which Hall called
McGinnis into his office, and "said he would overlook her attendance
problems if she would let him touch her vagina and [he] then proceeded to
grab her crotch." 142 In November 1997, McGinnis formally reported Hall's
conduct to management, which investigated the claims, determined that
Hall had violated the department's sexual harassment policy, and instituted
disciplinary action, prompting Hall to retire.
143
In response to McGinnis's claims against Hall and the Department for
violations of FEHA, the Department argued that California should adopt
Ellerth.14 4 The Department argued it had acted reasonably in disseminating
an anti-harassment policy and maintaining an effective grievance
mechanism through which McGinnis was able to file a complaint which
resulted in an immediate investigation and termination of the harassment.
1 45
Moreover, the Department argued that McGinnis unreasonably failed to
utilize the grievance mechanism, which could have prevented much, if not
all, of the resulting harm. 1
46
The California Supreme Court found that FEHA liability was not
constrained by traditional agency law; instead, employers are statutorily
liable for all supervisor harassment. 147 Thus, FEHA is not concerned with
136. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (West 2009). Note that this is a negligence standard.
137. Carrisales v. Dep't of Corr., 21 Cal. 4th 1132, 1136 (1999).
138. Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 647 (1998).
139. 31 Cal. 4th 1026 (2003).
140. Id. at 1035.
141. Id.
142. McGinnis, 31 Cal. 4th at 1035.
143. Id.
144. McGinnis, 31 Cal. 4th at 1035-36.
145. Id at 1036.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1040.
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avoiding the "automatic liability" that Meritor strives to avoid. A principle
basis of Ellerth was, therefore, statutorily overruled by FEHA. However,
the California Supreme Court held that application of the doctrine of
avoidable consequences was consistent with FEHA, and "to the extent the
United States Supreme Court grounded the Ellerth/Faragher defense in the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, its reasoning applies also to
California's FEHA."
' 148
We hold, therefore, that in a FEHA action against an employer for
hostile environment sexual harassment by a supervisor, an
employer may plead and prove a defense based on the avoidable
consequences doctrine. In this particular context, the defense has
three elements: (1) the employer took reasonable steps to prevent
and correct workplace sexual harassment; (2) the employee
unreasonably failed to use the preventive and corrective measures
that the employer provided; and (3) reasonable use of the
employer's procedures would have prevented at least some of the
harm that the employee suffered.
149
In principle, McGinnis articulated a rule identical to Ellerth. Both rules
insulate employers from liability for damages where: (a) the employer
acted reasonably, and (b) the employee acted unreasonably. McGinnis
merely clarifies in the third part of its rule what Ellerth explains in analysis:
An employee's failure to report is not unreasonable if the employer
reasonably believed the employer's procedures were ineffective.150
The difference between McGinnis and Ellerth is not, therefore, in their
rules, but in their application. California courts have consistently and
rigorously held that the doctrine of avoidable consequences is a defense to
damages and not liability and therefore summary judgment is not
appropriate merely because of avoidable consequences. 1 ' Although little
case law has developed around McGinnis, it seems to follow Ellerth more
accurately than federal courts have: The doctrine of avoidable
consequences is an affirmative defense to damages; the burden is on the
148. State Dep't of Health Servs. v. Superior Court (McGinnis), 31 Cal. 4th 1026,
1043-44 (2003).
149. Id.
150. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
151. See, e.g., Leung v. Millennium Biltmore Hotel Los Angeles, No. BC 323270,
2007 WL 4843010 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 25, 2007) (summary judgment not appropriate
based on avoidable consequences); Griffin v. Port of Oakland, No. 2002-037025, 2004 WL
5050350 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2004) (same); Garcia v. Brick Container Corp., No.
B177110, 2005 WL 2278017 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 20, 2005) (reversing summary judgment
for employer on McGinnis issue); Paul v. HCI Direct, Inc., No. RG03-091369, 2005 WL
5431501 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sep. 9, 2005) (holding that the doctrine of avoidable consequences
is a damages rule and may not be used to avoid liability); Skold v. Intel Corp., No. RG04-
145635, 2004 WL 5257641 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sep. 29, 2004) (same).
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defending employer; the reasonableness questions have not been
objectified as in federal courts; and instead, the issue of reasonableness is
resolved by juries that listen to the victims' stories.1 52
The dearth of California case law developing McGinnis suggests that
employers are settling cases instead of allowing juries to hear the
harassment stories. If this assumption is correct, California employers
should experience higher operating expenses for harassment. 153  An
economically rational employer should want to limit these costs by
investing in genuinely effective preventive mechanisms.
154
When cases do not settle, failure-to-report cases go to trial. Juries
listen to the victims' stories and judge for themselves whether or not the
conduct complained of was reasonable. 155 Although it is not clear whether
trial judges are admitting social science evidence about the rarity of
reporting by women, at least the jurors are able to hear the full context
surrounding the employee's response, perhaps from the victim herself.
This approach imposes more costs on employers than the federal system,
which in turn motivates employers to invest in preventive mechanisms.
156
It is difficult to explain why California lower courts are able to apply
McGinnis while federal courts fail to properly apply Ellerth.157  Partial
explanation flows from the cases themselves: McGinnis had the hindsight
of lower court application of Ellerth and explicitly cautioned against such
an application. 158  Ellerth may also have encouraged lower court
152. See Judicial Council of California, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION § 2526 (Dec. 2008
Supp.); See CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) 12.20.1 (2008 ed.).
153. This assumes the costs of settlement are greater than the costs to obtain
summary judgment in federal court.
154. The doctrine of avoidable consequences might also be a more equitable tool for
after-acquired evidence cases involving McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513
U.S. 352, 356 (1995) or for mixed-motive cases involving Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
155. See, e.g., Paul, 2005 WL 5431501 (finding that, after McGinnis, "a plaintiff can
have standing and establish liability for a statutory violation but not be able to recover any
monetary damages if the unlawful acts did not cause any monetary loss.").
156. Of course, the same incentivizing might result if federal courts imposed more
punitive damages or if Congress adopted something like the treble damage awards available
in antitrust law. Harassment, like monopolization, has similarly deleterious effects on
interstate commercial markets. Just as customer discrimination stifles the consumer market,
employee harassment stifles the labor market. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
300 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
Employees become less productive, demoralized, and less likely to report harassment in the
future, breading a deleterious culture. See Hebert, supra note 123, at 740 ("[T]he very fact
of being subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace may make some women less likely
to report the behavior.").
157. This author is, however, unable to cite to any evidence of diminished
harassment in California, compared to the rest of the country.
158. State Dep't of Health Servs. v. Superior Court (McGinnis), 31 Cal. 4th 1026,
1043-1044 (2003).
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objectification by the dicta following its rule. 159  Moreover, McGinnis
adopted a simple common law principle for which case law already existed,
while Ellerth crafted a rule that was not as clearly linked to an established
common law rule. A more cynical perspective might suggest that
California judges are simply more employee-friendly than federal judges. 1 60
D. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Some authors have questioned whether courts possess the institutional
competence to appreciate the results of social science research and use that
data to craft optimal incentives designed to diminish sexual harassment. 161
Accordingly, perhaps the best way to move beyond Ellerth lies with the
Obama-era Congress. This Congress already has a record for reversing
conservative judicial pronouncements relating to women in the
workplace. 162 With the high court more conservative than ever, 163 perhaps
efforts at reform are better directed to Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Title VII's primary goal, of course, is to end discrimination; the
victims of job discrimination want jobs, not lawsuits. [But] when unlawful
discrimination does occur, Title VII's secondary, fallback purpose is to
compensate the victims for their injuries.' ' 164  Ellerth tried to create an
incentive structure compromise. The burden on employers would increase
under a strict scrutiny liability standard, but this standard was mitigated
159. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("While proof that an employer had promulgated an
anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a
matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And
while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care
to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint
procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice
to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.").
160. But see Borges v. City of Hollister, No. C03-05670 HRL, 2005 WL 589797 at
*1, *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar 14, 2005) (finding that California law relegates the affirmative
defense to a damages issue).
161. Krieger, supra note 53, at 193.
162. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
163. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Balanced Court, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Sep. 13, 2007, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article--the myt
h_of the balanced-court ("[W]hat was once on the extreme right is now merely
conservative. What was once conservative is now centrist. What was centrist is now left
wing. What was once on the left no longer exists.") (last visited Nov. 18, 2009), and
Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think, 22 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2008) (finding that
four of the five most conservative justices in the past seventy years are currently sitting on
the court), and William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A
Statistical Study 18-19, 24 (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 404, 2008) available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1126403 (last visited Nov. 18,
2009).
164. Ford Motor, 458 U.S. at 230.
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somewhat by the affirmative defense. This carrot and stick was to give
employers an incentive to craft effective preventive and corrective
mechanisms. On the other side, employees gain the ability to make strict
liability claims, but were required not to unreasonably fail to utilize their
employer's antidiscrimination mechanisms. Each side gave something, lost
something, and society gained better workplace environments and
diminished litigation - in theory.
Tragically, lower court application of Ellerth has broken sticks, leaving
only a free carrot available to employers who merely create ineffective
policies. Besides failing to entice employers to create effective anti-
discrimination mechanisms and deter harassment, lower courts application
of Ellerth leaves most victims without compensation.
The expansion of Ellerth should motivate us to find ways to move
beyond it. This Note has explored pathways beyond Ellerth, but more
work is needed. Social scientists need to continue to study what types of
grievance policies are most conducive for victim utilization and what types
of things employers do to prevent harassment. If these best practices
become better established and more available to employers, the market will
probably encourage employers to adopt them - it still costs employers
money to defend cases they win on summary judgment. Moreover, if these
studies produce a clearer catalogue of employer best practices, courts will
be more likely to require that reasonable employers adopt these practices.
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